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We investigated a large outbreak of  Escherichia 
coli  O157 in the United Kingdom (UK) with 165 cases 
between 31 May and 29 July 2016. No linked cases 
were reported in other countries. Cases were pre-
dominately female (n = 128) and adult (n = 150), 66 
attended hospital and nine had features of haemor-
rhagic uraemic syndrome. A series of epidemiological 
studies (case–control, case–case, ingredients-based 
and venue-based studies) and supply chain investi-
gations implicated mixed salad leaves from Supplier 
A as the likely outbreak vehicle. Whole genome 
sequencing (WGS) indicated a link with strains from 
the Mediterranean and informed the outbreak con-
trol team to request that Supplier A cease distributing 
salad leaves imported from Italy. Microbiological tests 
of samples of salad leaves from Supplier A were nega-
tive. We were unable to confirm the source of contami-
nation or the contaminated constituent leaf although 
our evidence pointed to red batavia received from Italy 
as the most likely vehicle. Variations in Shiga toxin-
producing E.coli  surveillance and diagnosis may have 
prevented detection of cases outside the UK and high-
lights a need for greater standardisation. WGS was 
useful in targeting investigations, but greater cover-
age across Europe is needed to maximise its potential.
Introduction 
In June and July 2016, a large outbreak of Shiga toxin-
producing  Escherichia coli  (STEC) serotype O157:H7 
occurred in the United Kingdom (UK). The increase 
was first observed in the south-west of England 
where isolates of STEC O157:H7 phage type (PT)  34 
eae+ stx2+ stx1− were recovered from 24 cases report-
ing gastrointestinal symptoms within 1 week (20 to 26 
June 2016). This represented a 10-fold increase over 
the expected rate at this time of year in England and 
Wales. Whole genome sequencing (WGS) revealed that 
the isolates belonged to a 5-SNP single linkage cluster 
designated: 5.156.1329.2502.2965.3081.%.
A local outbreak investigation was initiated on 22 June 
2016 (Figure 1). Epidemiological and environmental 
investigations indicated a possible link to salad vege-
tables consumed at catering premises (e.g. restaurants 
or cafés). Cases were subsequently observed across 
England and Wales, and Public Health England (PHE) 
convened a national outbreak control team (OCT) on 29 
June to coordinate the investigation and response.
We describe here the epidemiological, environmen-
tal and microbiological investigations of this national 
outbreak.
Methods
Case definitions
Confirmed cases were cases with onset or specimen 
date from 31 May 2016 onwards and a cultured STEC O157 
isolate confirmed at the PHE Gastrointestinal Bacterial 
Reference Unit (GBRU) as PT 34  eae+ stx2+ stx1−, and 
a member of the 5-SNP single linkage cluster with the 
address 5.156.1329.2502.2965.3081.%.
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Probable cases were cases with onset or specimen 
date from 31 May 2016 onwards who either had a 
reference laboratory-confirmed infection with PT  34 
eae+ stx2+ stx1−, in the absence of WGS results, or had 
serological evidence of STEC O157 infection and were 
epidemiologically linked (close or household contacts) 
to a confirmed case.
Secondary cases were confirmed or probable cases 
with onset 2 days or more after household contact with 
another confirmed or probable case.
Clinical microbiology
Isolates of non-sorbitol-fermenting  E. coli  O157 
identified in frontline hospital laboratories, were sent 
to the GBRU for confirmation,  stx1,  stx2  and  eae  ge
ne detection, phage typing and WGS [1,2]. Genomes 
were compared with the sequences held in the PHE 
STEC O157 WGS database which comprises genomes 
from more than 2,000 cultures (human and animal iso-
lates) of STEC O157 submitted to GBRU between 1982 
and 2015. Frontline laboratories were also requested 
to send faecal or serum samples to GBRU from symp-
tomatic contacts (diarrhoea (often bloody) and/or 
abdominal cramps or haemolytic uraemic syndrome 
(HUS)) of confirmed outbreak cases if conventional cul-
ture methods failed to isolate this pathogen.
Epidemiological investigation
Initial hypothesis generation
Detailed questionnaires about exposures were com-
pleted by telephone interview for 12 probable cases 
(all subsequently confirmed) who had onset dates in 
mid-June and were resident in South West England. 
This generated the initial null hypotheses that illness 
was not associated with eating salad leaves (e.g. let-
tuce, mixed leaves, watercress and/or baby spinach) or 
consumption of salad leaves at catering premises.
We developed a bespoke web-based questionnaire 
on consumption of salad vegetables, herbs and fruit 
to identify any additional hypotheses for investiga-
tion and administered it to 75 probable and confirmed 
cases in England up to 8 July. The results were consist-
ent with the initial null hypotheses.
Refined hypothesis generation
The hypotheses were refined to bagged mixed salad 
leaves supplied by UK producer-supplier Supplier A 
following epidemiological and supply chain investiga-
tions. Four epidemiological studies were undertaken to 
test the hypothesis with some cases included in more 
than one study.
Case–control study
A case–control study was conducted to test the initial 
null hypotheses. This study preceded WGS results and 
included probable cases with onset of illness after 1 
June 2016 resident in southern England (most cases 
at the time of the study were residents in southern 
England). Controls were aged 18 years and over (all 
cases at time of study were 18 years or older) and fre-
quency matched by sex and region of residence. Four 
controls per case were recruited from a commercial 
online market research panel [3]. Exposure data were 
collected via a web-based questionnaire for the 10 
days before recruitment (controls) or before onset of 
symptoms (cases). Variables included in the multivari-
able analysis were exposures included in the hypoth-
eses, sex and region of residence, as well as variables 
Figure 1
Timeline of investigation, Shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli outbreak, United Kingdom, June–July 2016
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with odds ratio (OR) > 1, p < 0.20 and with at least 20% 
of cases exposed in single variable analysis.
Case–case study
A case–case study of probable and confirmed cases 
resident in England, with onset of illness after 1 June 
2016 was undertaken to supplement the results of the 
case–control study. Comparator cases were identified 
from the STEC national enhanced surveillance data-
base using the following inclusion criteria:
• Sporadic cases (not linked to an outbreak and iso-
lates not part of any WGS cluster at the 5-SNP level 
or below);
• Cases infected with a different serotype (non-O157) 
and/or PT (not PT 34) to the outbreak strain;
• Cases who had not travelled outside the UK in the 
week before symptom onset;
• Cases with symptom onset in May or June of the 
years 2009 to 2016;
• Cases who were 18 years or older at the time of 
onset.
Food and environmental exposures for outbreak and 
comparator cases recorded as free text in the enhanced 
Figure 2
Maximum likelihood phylogenetic trees of the outbreak isolates (n = 165) with nearest genetic neighbours (right panel) and 
a representative sample of historical isolates of STEC O157: H7 (left panel), shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli outbreak, 
United Kingdom, June–July 2016
PHE: Public Health England.
Left panel: population structure of STEC O157:H7 based on 311 representative isolates from the PHE collection with the three major lineages (I, 
I/II and II) indicated. The position of the outbreak clade is depicted by a black star.
Right panel: the 165 cases from the 5-SNP outbreak cluster and the 22 closest sporadic isolates (same 50-SNP cluster) in the PHE database 
with country of travel indicated where known. Date is given for non-outbreak cases.
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surveillance questionnaires were condensed to single 
keywords [4]. Age, sex, region of residence and expo-
sures with OR > 1, lower 95% confidence interval (CI) > 1 
and with at least 20% of cases exposed in the single 
variable analysis were included in the multivariable 
analysis.
Ingredient-based cluster study
Fourteen cases ate at two catering premises (a staff 
canteen and a café) during their incubation period. 
Both premises received 22 common salad vegetables 
ingredients from the same wholesale Distributor B who 
sourced product from Supplier A.
An ingredient-based case–control study was conducted 
to test the hypothesis that consumption of salad veg-
etables supplied by Distributor B was associated with 
illness. The chefs provided a full list of ingredients for 
all menu items. Exposure data collected for the two 
premises were pooled for the ingredients analysis.
Exposures with OR ≥ 2, p < 0.1 and with more than 60% of 
cases exposed in single variable analysis were included 
in the multivariable analysis. A detailed description of 
this study is available here [5].
Food chain comparison study
A venue-based study was undertaken to test the 
refined hypothesis, using a matched case–control 
study design (venue as unit of analysis). The expo-
sure was defined as having received salad leaves from 
Supplier A in the study period.
The supplier of salad leaves received in June 2016 was 
ascertained from case and control venues. The supply 
chain was traced back until the salad leaf producer or 
the importer was identified. The analysis used simple 
conditional logistic regression.
A detailed description of this study is described by 
Inns et al. in this issue of Eurosurveillance [6].
Exposure window assessment
To inform trace-back investigations, mathematical 
modelling was undertaken to estimate the period of 
exposure based on onset dates of cases and likely 
Figure 3
Epicurve of primary, secondary and unsure cases, outbreak of shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli, United Kingdom, 30 
May–29 July 2016 (n = 161a)
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incubation periods using non-parametric and para-
metric back-calculation methods [7,8]. Using reported 
timescales for each stage of the supply chain, the time 
period during which the implicated product was des-
patched from Supplier A was estimated.
Environmental investigations
Supply chain investigation
Supply chain investigation was undertaken by local 
Environmental Health Officers (EHO) and coordinated 
by the Food Standards Agency (FSA). The investiga-
tions focused on salad vegetables: bagged, loose, 
whole head and other ready to eat salad vegetables. 
The FSA (working with food safety authorities in other 
European Union countries) initiated trace-forward and 
trace-backward investigations for salad vegetables 
from implicated suppliers and catering premises.
Information from the trace-back and trace-forward 
investigations were recorded in an MS Excel tracing 
template and reviewed by the FSA and PHE. Data were 
extracted, prepared and analysed using FoodChain-
Laboratory (FCL) [9]. FCL calculated tracing scores for 
venues and products under investigation. Venues or 
products with higher scores were more likely to be 
implicated in the outbreak [9].
Environmental sampling
The following samples were collected by EHOs and sub-
mitted to the PHE Food, Water and Environment labo-
ratories (FWE) for testing for STEC: remnants of salad 
vegetables consumed by cases during their incubation 
period and any associated retained packaging as well 
as environmental swabs, salad leaves and seeds from 
suppliers, wholesale distributors, retail and catering 
premises. Environmental samples were transported 
and analysed according to the ISO and PHE standard 
methods [10-12].
Growing and/or processing procedures for suppliers 
and wholesale distributors identified in the supply 
chain investigation were reviewed. A history of staff ill-
ness at salad leaf processing venues was sought. Stool 
samples were obtained for STEC testing from food han-
dlers who reported gastrointestinal illness during May 
or June.
Surveillance for re-emergence of the outbreak
Modelling of supply chain timelines and incubation 
period distributions indicated that all new cases asso-
ciated with an introduction of a contaminated product 
at Supplier A would be identified by PT within 39 days 
of product arrival to Supplier A (90% within 27 days 
and 99% within 37 days).
Two methods were developed to support the declara-
tion of the end of the outbreak and facilitate detection 
of any re-emergence: (i) the number of enhanced STEC 
surveillance questionnaires received at PHE each day 
was compared with the number expected using the 
Farrington exceedance algorithm (modified to account 
for weekend effects) and alerts generated by the algo-
rithm were reviewed for possible re-emergence of the 
outbreak [13]. (ii) The proportion of STEC O157 PT 34 
cases vs STEC O157 of other PTs was evaluated on a 
daily basis. Both methods were applied for 5 weeks 
after the last confirmed case was reported based on 
the modelled estimates described above.
Results
Microbiology
All isolates from 165 confirmed cases belonged to the 
same 5-SNP cluster (5.156.1329.2502.2965.3081.%), 
indicating a common source. The clade to which this 
outbreak cluster belonged was uncommon in the PHE 
database and was not very diverse, indicative of infre-
quent sampling from a widespread pool of strains. 
None of the isolates belonging to this clade were from 
Table 1
Single variable and final multivariable model, case–control study, outbreak of shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli, United 
Kingdom, June–July 2016 (n = 112)
Exposure/risk factor
Single variable analysis Final multivariable model
OR 95% CI p value aOR 95% CI p value
Salad in catering premises 18.92 4.69–81.19 < 0.01 8.30 1.96–35.15 <0.01
Mixed salad 8.88 2.75–31.01 < 0.01 4.56 1.17–17.79 0.03
Supermarket SB 3.45 1.14–10.33 0.01 2.70 0.01–0.39 0.12
Any tomato 0.84 0.25–3.33 0.77 1.47 0.29–7.33 0.64
Any lettuce 0.89 0.30–2.90 0.82 1.31 0.34–5.10 0.70
Supermarket SA 2.03 0.60–6.34 0.18 1.21 0.28–5.22 0.79
Region of residence ND ND ND 0.78 0.18–3.43 0.74
Male sex ND ND ND 0.52 0.09–3.19 0.48
Cucumber 0.84 0.29–2.61 0.73 0.41 0.10–1.73 0.22
aOR: adjusted odds ratio; CI: confidence interval; ND: not done; OR: odds ratio.
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UK animals. A higher proportion of cases with this 
clade reported travel to Mediterranean countries, com-
pared with other clades in the database (Figure 2).
Epidemiology
There were 124 primary and 10 secondary cases and 31 
cases referred to as ‘unsure’ who could not be classi-
fied as primary or secondary (Figure 3). They were part 
of a protracted outbreak/cluster (n = 17), were asymp-
tomatic (n = 2), epidemiologically linked to a confirmed 
case with a missing date of onset (n = 4), or unsure 
whether they were a contact of case (n = 8). 
The onset dates ranged from 30 May to 29 July 2016. 
The latest date of onset for a primary case was 5 July. 
The number of cases peaked between 18 and 20 June 
2016. Three cases travelled overseas during their incu-
bation period. Seventy per cent of cases (116/166) were 
adult women. Cases were between 1 and 98 years-old 
(median: 51 years; interquartile rang e (IQR): 29–72 
years). They were from England (n = 155), Wales (n = 6), 
Northern Ireland (n = 4) and Scotland (n = 1). Twenty-
eight cases were linked to catering premises visited by 
at least two cases and a further 19 cases were linked 
to a Care home SE.
Sixty-six cases attended hospital, nine (two of them 
children) developed HUS and of these, two adult 
cases died. Among cases with known symptom details 
(n = 160), 127 cases reported bloody diarrhoea and a 
further 13 non-bloody diarrhoea.
Case–control study
The study included 21 cases and 91 controls. Nineteen 
cases were female. The median age for cases was 48 
years (range: 18–83 years) and 56 years (range: 20–77 
years) in controls (p = 0.072). Multivariable analysis 
using a forward selection procedure showed that illness 
was associated with mixed salad leaves (OR = 4.56; 
95% CI: 1.17–17.79) and salad eaten at one catering 
premises (OR = 8.30; 95% CI: 1.96–35.15) (Table 1).
Case–case study
The study included 69 outbreak and 266 comparator 
cases.
The multivariable analysis indicated an associa-
tion between outbreak cases and salad consumption 
(OR = 2.96; 95% CI: 1.62–5.39), eating out at a café 
(OR = 2.49; 95% CI: 1.26–4.94), consumption of raw 
vegetables (OR = 2.29; 95% CI: 1.23–4.26) and shop-
ping at Supermarket SC (OR = 2.34; 95% CI: 1.08–5.07) 
(Table 2).
Ingredient-based cluster study
There were 203 valid responses: 186 respondents ate 
at the staff canteen, 17 respondents ate at the café. 
Twenty-four respondents were defined as cases. The 
median age of cases and non-cases were 51 and 47 
years-old, respectively.
Nine salad ingredients met the inclusion criteria for the 
multivariable analysis, only baby leaf salad was inde-
pendently associated with illness (OR = 13.15; 95% CI: 
1.62–106.50) (Table 3).
Food chain comparison report
Data were obtained for 86 venues (43 complete case–
control venue pairs). The 43 case venues were associ-
ated with 57 cases. Thirty case and 10 control venues 
were supplied with salad leaves by Supplier A.
The odds of a venue being supplied with salad leaves 
by Supplier A were 7.67 times higher (95% CI: 2.30–
25.53) for case venues than for control venues.
Exposure window assessment
The back-calculation methods showed that exposure 
was likely to have occurred throughout June with peak 
exposure between 10 and 19 June 2016, with an addi-
tional likely limited exposure around 27 May 2016. 
Based on supply chain timelines, this equated to 
Table 2
Single variable and final multivariable model, case–case study, outbreak of shiga toxin-producing Escherichia coli, United 
Kingdom, June–July 2016 (n = 335)
Exposure/risk factor
Single variable analysis Final multivariable model
OR 95% CI p value aOR 95% CI p value
Male sex ND ND ND 0.61 0.31–1.20 0.15
Age ND ND ND 1.01 0.99–1.03 0.08
Salad 3.11 1.80–5.37 0.01 2.96 1.62–5.39 < 0.01
Eating at a catering premises 2.27 1.24–4.17 <0.01 2.49 1.26–4.94 0.01
Supermarket SC 2.36 1.18–4.72 0.01 2.34 1.08–5.07 0.03
Raw vegetables 3.27 1.84–5.81 <0.01 2.29 1.23–4.26 0.01
Supermarket SD 2.00 1.12–3.56 <0.01 1.83 0.97–3.47 0.06
Salmon 2.89 1.47–5.69 0.01 1.82 0.84–3.94 0.13
aOR: adjusted odds ratio; CI: confidence interval; ND: not done; OR: odds ratio.
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potentially contaminated product arriving to Supplier A 
between 6 and 14 June 2016.
Environment
Supply chain investigation
The investigation in the south-west of England iden-
tified that wholesale Distributor B was linked to 17 
catering premises where cases had eaten. Distributor 
B supplied unwashed mixed baby leaves to these 
catering premises sourced from three UK producer-sup-
pliers. Produce could not be traced from the catering 
premises back to a specific producer-supplier because 
Distributor B did not maintain records of their distribu-
tion of incoming batches.
Investigations focused on one of the three UK pro-
ducer-suppliers, Supplier A, who supplied salad leaves 
to catering premises linked to cases outside the south 
west of England. A forward trace could be established 
from Supplier A to all catering premises linked to two 
or more cases. Single salad leaf produce purchased 
by Supplier A for distribution in the UK, was predomi-
nantly purchased from wholesale distributors who 
source produce from other intermediate distributors or 
directly from farms. Mixing of single leaves occurred at 
various points along the supply chain before arrival at 
Supplier A. The investigation was refined to seeds or 
leaves of non-UK (Mediterranean) origin following anal-
ysis of the WGS phylogeny. These included red batavia 
and rocket grown in Italy and green mizuna and rocket 
grown in the UK from Italian seeds. Contaminated red 
batavia received from Italy on 6 June was suspected as 
the source of the outbreak based on the exposure win-
dow assessment and supply chain timelines.
Rapid Alert System for Food and Feed (RASFF) news 
notification was issued by the UK on 5 July and a 
request was made by the FSA to the Italian authorities 
for details of the traceability of potentially implicated 
salad leaves. Sampling details and information on pro-
duction at specific premises were also requested.
At least seven Italian suppliers and more than 10 pro-
ducers across northern and central Italy could have 
supplied produce to Supplier A for distribution between 
6 and 14 June. Italian investigations did not identify 
any breaches in practice to explain the outbreak. STEC 
O157 was not detected in 51 samples of salad leaves 
and vegetables taken from the areas where the sup-
pliers to Supplier A were located. All indicator  E. 
coli detected in routine water and salad samples from 
the implicated farms around the time of the outbreak 
were within acceptable levels. No detections of STEC 
O157 were reported in samples from the implicated 
farms (sampled following the RASFF notification and 
FSA request).
Environmental sampling in the United Kingdom
STEC O157 was not detected in 191 environmental sam-
ples: 140 salad items (including rocket, red batavia, 
mizuna, mixed leaves, cucumber and tomatoes), 37 
environmental swabs, nine samples of seeds for salad 
leaf crops, and five water samples. Samples were 
obtained from producers and wholesalers (n = 99), 
catering premises (n = 49), care homes (n = 17), retail-
ers (n = 15) and the homes of cases (n = 11). STEC 
O128 stx2b+stx1c+ was detected by PCR and culture in 
a sample of mixed leaves taken from a fruit and vegeta-
ble shop. Stx genes were detected by PCR in a sample 
of red batavia from Supplier A; however, STEC could 
not be isolated by culture.
Nine samples of leaves taken from a Retailer W, the staff 
canteen and Care home SE had  E. coli  levels greater 
than 100 cfu/g (the level used to prompt a review and 
improvements in production hygiene and quality of the 
raw product) [14]. No food handlers reported symptoms 
during May or June.
Control measures
On 30 June, following advice from the OCT, Supplier 
A discontinued using, and advised their customers to 
withdraw, products containing salad leaves sourced 
from Italy. This advice remained in place for five weeks.
Surveillance for re-emergence of the outbreak
The outbreak was declared over on the 27 July 2016, 22 
days after the date of onset of the last primary case and 
28 days after the control measures taken by Supplier 
A. Three cases (two primary and one secondary) with 
isolates within the same 5-SNP single linkage cluster 
were identified during the 5-week period of enhanced 
surveillance for re-emergence. Investigation failed to 
Table 3
Single variable and final multivariable model for ingredients consumed at the canteen or cafe, outbreak of shiga toxin-
producing Escherichia coli, United Kingdom, June–July 2016 (n = 203)
Exposure/risk factor
Single variable analysis Final multivariable model
OR 95% CI p value aOR 95% CI p value
Red onion 4.26 1.56–12.32  < 0.01 2.07 0.78–5.50 0.13
Baby mixed leaf 19.71 3.01–822.99  < 0.01 13.15 1.62–106.50 <0.01
aOR: adjusted odds ratio; CI: confidence interval; OR: odds ratio.
A case was defined as a possible, probable or confirmed case.
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identify a link with the outbreak. Surveillance for re-
emergence remained in place for a further 5 weeks 
after the detection of the three cases. The OCT stood 
down on 4 October.
Discussion
Multidisciplinary working, supported by robust, novel 
and rapid epidemiological studies and extensive sup-
ply chain investigations, was vital to identifying the 
mixed salad leaves from Supplier A as the likely source 
of the infection in this large national outbreak. WGS 
provided useful information about the likely origin of 
the produce and informed the advice from the OCT 
to Supplier A to discontinue distribution of imported 
salad leaves.
Contaminated salad leaves have been linked to out-
breaks of STEC O157 previously [15]. Contamination 
with STEC O157 can occur before, during or after har-
vest [16,17]. STEC O157 can survive on leaf surfaces 
and within leaf tissue and remain after standard 
post-harvest decontamination procedures [18,19]. Cut 
leaves provide a more favourable environment for the 
organism to survive and proliferate [18]. It is therefore 
necessary to prevent contamination from the point of 
growth and harvest through the supply chain to the 
final processor. Growers, processors and suppliers are 
required to follow good practice guidelines to control 
all hazards along the production pathway [20,21].
We were unable to confirm the source of contamina-
tion or the constituent leaf that acted as a vehicle for 
infection, although our evidence pointed to red batavia 
received from Italy as the most likely vehicle. Our inves-
tigation was challenged by the complex international 
and national supply network for salad leaves which pro-
vided multiple opportunities for cross-contamination.
FCL helped manage and visualise delivery data and 
identified Supplier A as a common link early in the 
investigation. However, the data available from suppli-
ers, wholesalers and catering premises had different 
formats and their accounts of how long the products 
were in the supply chain varied between 2 and 9 days. 
This limited interpretation at the level of the constitu-
ent leaf.
Routine testing practices in the UK and Italy include 
indicator organisms only (E. coli  or coliform bacteria) 
and not STEC O157, which limited our investigation. 
These methods would not have detected low levels 
of faecal contamination with sufficient STEC O157 to 
cause illness [22,23]. In addition, not all routine sam-
ples tested were taken during the exposure window. 
Above average rainfall was recorded in the northern 
regions of Italy during the exposure window. Transient 
contamination by surface run-off from neighbouring 
farmlands would only have been detected if routine 
testing had coincided with periods of high rainfall [24].
Another challenge we encountered was the lack compa-
rable case information from other European countries. 
Epidemic Intelligence Information System (EPIS) and 
Early Warning and Response System (EWRS) alerts did 
not identify linked cases in other countries, and many 
countries took more than 10 days to respond. There is 
no standard approach to subtyping of STEC O157 and 
most European countries do not undertake WGS. The 
European Centre for Disease Control (ECDC) currently 
recommends multilocus variable-number tandem 
repeat analysis (MLVA) and pulsed-field gel electro-
phoresis (PFGE), and many countries undertake PFGE 
only [25]. In England and Wales, isolates of STEC O157 
are subjected to phage typing, with WGS introduced for 
surveillance and outbreak detection in 2015 [1]. PFGE is 
not directly comparable to phage typing or WGS; there-
fore, cases associated with this outbreak that may 
have occurred elsewhere in Europe at the same time 
would not necessarily have been identified.
There is evidence of the value of WGS in outbreak 
investigations through the timely and accurate iden-
tification of linked cases [26,27]. Phylogenetic analy-
sis may also provide an indication whether the source 
of contamination is likely to be domestic or imported 
[28]. In this outbreak, the absence of WGS data from 
other European countries limited our ability to identify 
the geographical origin of the contaminated vehicle or 
evaluate the evolutionary context.
The case definitions used, the nature of the report-
ing (voluntary or compulsory) and coverage (national 
or local) of the surveillance schemes for STEC vary 
between and within countries [29]. In many European 
countries, surveillance for STEC is regional and on clin-
ical presentation: bloody diarrhoea, HUS or suspected 
HUS with one national voluntary HUS surveillance 
scheme [30,31]. HUS was an uncommon presentation in 
this outbreak and systems reliant on HUS would have 
failed to identify outbreak cases with diarrhoea only.
Despite these challenges, rapid epidemiological inves-
tigations along with supply chain investigations and 
analysis of WGS data resulted in prompt identification 
of the likely vehicle and informed the control measures 
which may have reduced the extent and duration of the 
outbreak.
Complex supply networks, multiple opportunities for 
contamination and limited records kept by food busi-
nesses highlight the need for robust mechanisms to 
trace salad leaves from farm to fork. Food businesses 
and regulators should work together to agree a mini-
mum, high quality dataset for routine use to facilitate 
product tracing during outbreaks.
The complexity of the supply chain extending across 
Europe makes European collaboration essential and 
highlights the need for greater standardisation of sur-
veillance and sharing of information between countries 
in a timely manner. Further harmonisation of testing 
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across Europe would be beneficial; WGS was useful 
in targeting our investigations, but greater coverage is 
needed if its potential is to be maximised. Given the 
challenges of investigating outbreaks linked to salad 
items, a combination of epidemiological and other 
methods undertaken rapidly and in parallel is likely to 
be needed to identify sources and control outbreaks.
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